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Abstract
In this essay I analyse Wittgenstein’s criticism of several assumptions that are crucial for a
large part of cognitive science. These involve the concepts of computational processes in the
brain which cause mental states and processes, the algorithmic processing of information in
the brain (neural system), the brain as a machine, psychophysical parallelism, the thinking
machine, as well as the confusion of rule following with behaviour in accordance with the
rule. In my opinion, the theorists of cognitive science have not yet seriously considered Witt-
genstein’s criticism so they, quite surprisingly, frequently confuse the question »how does it
work?« with »what does it do?« But their most »deleterious« mistake is their confusion of the
internal computational (or parallel) processes taking place in the brain (which possibly cause
mental states) with socially-based, everyday criteria of recognition and classification of, and
knowledge about, the content of mental states.
The title of this essay is metaphorical. I believe that watching a human
thought in action is as difficult as catching a flying bird (with one’s hands).
We have a chance to catch a bird only when it happens to come sufficiently
close, perhaps pausing for a moment to sit on a branch next to us, or when
it lands right in front of us to grab some food. But at that moment it is not
a »flying bird«, but at most a bird that is just about to start flying (again).
Yet, even in such moments our chances of getting hold of the bird are very
small, a fact probably well known to anyone who has already tried to catch
a bird. A human thought is much like a bird. Most of the time thoughts
»fly« through our minds, meaning that they appear in our consciousness
for a moment and then promptly disappear, i.e. are replaced with new
thoughts. The very attempt to understand what happens inside our minds
when we think some thought changes that thought into something else
(another thought). In much the same way, we cannot understand how it is
possible that with our thought we can ‘touch’ things that are entirely diffe-
rent from that thought, perhaps physically inaccessible or even non-exis-
tent. But as soon as we contemplate the thought in this manner, that thought
‘escapes’ us, and we end up staring in surprise, unable to understand what
is happening. At times it may seem to us that the thought has stopped, so
to say, that it stands clear in our sight and we will be able to seize it and
understand what it is and what it means to »have a thought in one’s mind«
or to »think about this or that«. This phenomenon can be experienced
when we, say, puzzle over a completely ‘absorbing’ problem and some par-
ticular thought is one of the assumptions that constitute that problem.
However, as soon as we concentrate on that particular thought and move
away from the problem which it constitutes, the thought often disappears
promptly, i.e. escapes our mental horizon. This is one of the reasons why
assumptions about the problem are difficult to analyse – for us, they make
sense only insofar as we experience them as part of the problem, but this
sense is lost as soon as we analyse them as such.
Wittgenstein presents a similar difficulty in his Philosophical Investigations
(PI, 1976).
»’The queer thing, thought’ – but it does not strike us as queer when we are thinking. Thought
does not strike us as mysterious while we are thinking, but only when we say, as it were retro-
spectively: ‘How was that possible?’ How was it possible for thought to deal with the very ob-
ject itself? We feel as if by means of it we had caught reality in our net.« (PI, par. 428).
Thoughts seem to be an extremely elusive ‘mental phenomenon’. We know
what they are as long as no one asks us, but once asked, we no longer
know, to paraphrase Augustine’s witty remark about time. Many other
‘mental phenomena’ produce similar experiences, for example, under-
standing, intention, wish, will, feeling and so on.
In Wittgenstein’s words, this is not the kind of question typically posed by
the natural sciences, but
»… something that we know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed
to give an account of it, is something we need to remind ourselves of. (And it is obviously
something of which for some reason it is difficult to remind oneself.)« (PI, par. 89).
During his ‘late stage’ Wittgenstein pointed out how erroneous it is to seek
causes and reasons for the elusiveness and indefiniteness of mental phe-
nomena in their secretive nature, for example, strictly private ‘internal’
processes that are supposedly accessible only to pure introspection and
about which one can speak only in the first person singular, with no other
person being able to know about these processes except the person who is
being introspective. According to this understanding, people can reach hy-
pothetical conclusions about the mental states of others only on the basis
of that person’s visible behaviour, so the domain of the mental presumably
fits into an entirely different order of things and events than the domain of
the physical.
Wittgenstein strongly rejected this idea, arguing that it was absurd. Yet he
also rejected the views of behaviourists, whom the elusiveness and subjec-
tivity of mental states led to conclude that intellectuality, thinking, con-
sciousness and the like were just appearances not grounded in reality,
meaning that all we are left with is the physical behaviour of people. He
speaks of the grammatical fiction of behaviourism (PI, par. 308) and says:
»How does the philosophical problem about mental process and states and about behaviour-
ism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and
states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them –
we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we
have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better… – And now the
analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the
yet uncomprehended process in yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied
mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them« (par. 309).
Wittgenstein points out that to talk about the thinking process, as a ‘non-
-corporeal’ process is misleading because thought cannot be separated from
speech and behaviour. Such talk expresses our confusion arising from, on
the one hand, our attempt to determine the meaning of the word ‘to think’
in a primitive manner, and on the other, our grammatical differentiation
between, say, the grammar of the word ‘to think’ and that of ‘to eat’ (PI,
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par. 339). He, however, adds that the difference in meanings seems to be
too small (in much the same way as the difference between our saying that
digits are real and numbers non-real is small).
This provides room for a ‘third’ possibility, i.e. an attempt to conceptualise
intellect, thinking, experience and similar phenomena as ‘internal’ physical
states and physical processes taking place within the physiological structure
of an individual, say, within one’s brain, as a result of certain internal
mechanisms, e.g. computations taking place inside the brain. One advan-
tage of this approach is that it preserves ‘intuition’ about the internal pro-
cesses and states, a concept that so forcefully imposes itself on our con-
sciousness, while at the same time rejecting the idea that these processes
and states are inaccessible to scientific research. The notion of the internal
physical processes and mechanisms in the human brain that cause mental
phenomena or lead to them is undoubtedly very attractive for a large part
of cognitive science. However, it has its principled limitations also pointed
out by Wittgenstein. He opposed not just the idea that non-material pro-
cesses taking place within an individual are inaccessible, but also the idea
of the ‘internal mechanism’ or ‘internal processes’ in general. For him, the
‘external–internal process’ difference is simply too small to be useful in ex-
plaining the predicaments arising from everyday discourse and, even more
so, philosophical discourse on mental phenomena.
According to Wittgenstein, of all the mental ‘phenomena,’ it is understand-
ing and intention in particular that resist our attempts to conceptualise
these as internal states or processes. In relation to these two phenomena,
even the categories of ‘state’ and ‘process’ are questionable.
»The intention with which one acts does not ‘accompany’ the action any more than the thought
‘accompanies’ speech. Thought and intention are neither ‘articulated’ nor ‘not articulated’; to
be compared neither with a single note which sounds during the acting or speaking, nor with a
tune. ‘Talking’ (whether out loud or silently) and ‘thinking’ are not concepts of the same kind;
even thought they are in closest connection« (PI, II xi, p. 217).
Or, the same thought, expressed still more explicitly:
»Meaning it is not a process which accompanies a word. For no process could have the conse-
quences of meaning. (Similarly, I think, it could be said: a calculation is not an experiment, for
no experiment could have the peculiar consequences of a multiplication.«) (PI, II xi., p. 218).
The part in brackets is important because cognitive science often assumes
that a calculation is a mental process equivalent to some physical process
in a processor, or to a biophysical neural process. Indeed, such a process
would more resemble a kind of ‘micro-experiment’ than a calculation, which
is the idea strongly rejected by Wittgenstein.
In his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (RPP, 1980), Wittgenstein
even explicitly stated that no assumption seems more natural to him than
the assumption that association, i.e. thinking, is not any kind of brain pro-
cess, so the understanding of mental processes on the basis of brain processes
is impossible (RPP, I., par. 903). As an illustration he uses the example of
the seed. Identical seeds always produce identical plants, although nothing
in that seed corresponds to the plant, so it is not possible to conclude which
plant the seed will produce exclusively on the basis of its properties or
structure. Only the history of the seed could possibly give us a clue as to
which plant will grow from it. According to Wittgenstein, in a similar man-
ner an entirely amorphous mass could produce an organism, almost with-
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out reason. So, he wonders whether something similar could be the case
with our thoughts, our speech or writing.1 Later in the text Wittgenstein
even goes so far as to raise doubt about the assumption that every mental
process has a corresponding ‘trace’ in our brains, thus allowing the possi-
bility that there exist psychological patterns that are not matched by any
physiological patterns (RPP, I., par. 905). »If this turns upside down our
notion of causality«, says Wittgenstein, »then it is time for it to be turned
upside down«.2 He also adds that the prejudice about the parallelism of the
psychological and the physical is a result of our primitive interpretation of
grammar. Because, if we allow that psychological phenomena follow a
principle of causality that is not physiologically mediated, then we assume
that there exists a kind of soul besides the body (RPP, I., par. 906).
This is not to say that Wittgenstein suddenly turned into an advocate of du-
alism, i.e. the thesis about a spiritual substance that exists apart from the
body and enables spiritual phenomena. In fact, he was simply stressing,
perhaps in a slightly exaggerated manner, a profound difference between
human thinking and all other human processes or states, either material or
non-material. In Wittgenstein’s view, it is not possible to speak of thinking
as a private process; it can be viewed only in the context of people’s social
activities. In other words, thinking takes place only within the context of
rule following, within various linguistic games and within the interplay of
human actions. These relationships cannot be translated back into the pro-
cesses taking place within individuals, or into individual behaviours.
By saying that thinking is an internal process within our brain, i.e. a physio-
logical process within the body that causes thinking or is thinking itself, we
are in danger of cutting off thinking from the intersubjective practices of
speech, mutual understanding, social functioning of people in various si-
tuations (contexts) and so on. Such a process would be, in a way, self-
sufficient, and that would make it, after all, as ‘private’ as are the states and
processes of the presumably spiritual substance. As long as we do not have
available an intersubjectively verifiable (publicly accessible) and systematic
link between assumed internal states and processes taking place within the
brain, and between the individual’s action in intersubjective (social) con-
texts, we are exposed to Wittgenstein’s criticism of private speech, private
states and processes. Of course, it is possible to hypothesize that such a link
cannot be excluded in principle and that, at some point in the future, it
might be possible to explicate. However, we are still left with an embarrassing
gap between the publicly accessible, ‘external’ practice of people’s actions in
various situations (e.g. language games) that determines the meaning of our
experiences, wishes, intentions, thoughts, and between the ‘internal’ (physical)
nature, i.e. structure of these experiences, wishes and the like.
The point here is that this is not solely a conceptual rift between the sub-
strates of mental states presumably entirely explicable by computation, but
a rift between how ‘processors’ work, meaning processors that constitute
the physiological-physical basis of mental states, and what and how we are
when experiencing these states and expressing them in our social practice.
The ‘how we are’ is essentially connected with the fact that our experienc-
ing and functioning has meaning for us, that we feel our existence precisely
through experiencing and functioning. The difference between the two is
not just conceptual, but it is a difference in categories, and we have not the
slightest clue as to how this rift could be overcome.
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The very notion of the ‘working’ of a processor involves an ambiguity per-
taining to description of the causal process, i.e. the sequence of the proces-
sor’s states vs. the rules of processors’ working. The former can be attained
by listing the physical laws that regulate the physical flow of events and ini-
tial states of the processor at particular moments; to attain the latter, we
could, for example, present the operation table featuring the processor’s
transitions from one state to another, depending on the input and the cur-
rent state of the processor. Yet such a table would be a completely ideali-
zed creation, showing how the process should work in ideal circumstances
rather than how it actually works. It is just one of the possible descriptions
of the rules of working presumably implemented by the processor, not a
description of the process. Such rules can also be presented in a table list-
ing the operations that the processor can ‘perform’ provided those suitable
inputs and suitable internal states are present. Yet whichever approach we
adopt in determining the rules of processor’s working, we have to keep in
mind the difference between the idealized, operational working and the ac-
tual flow of events, i.e., the actual sequence of the processor’s physical
states. The operational working of the processor is the kind of working we
ascribe to it when we interpret it as the implementation of a certain rule or
tabular description of operation.
Cognitive sciences frequently refer to the ‘Turing machine’ model that is
believed to represent the general formula for the computational working of
natural or artificial processors. However, this model is just an idealized
structure of the system’s working to which is ascribed computational work-
ing, with no actual system corresponding to this model. The difference lies
not just in the fact that a Turing machine uses an infinite memory tape, but
also in the fact that this ‘machine’ is capable of returning, after several
computational steps, to precisely the same state. By contrast, actual, finite
automata never really ‘return’ to the same state, only to the ‘same kind’ of
state that belongs in the same equivalence class of states with regard to a
certain equivalence relation between the states. Therefore, it is a question
whether in this case it is possible at all to speak about computation in the
sense of ‘operating with symbols’.
In his essay, that appeared in a collection of essays on the legacy of Turing,
C. Fields explicitly stressed that it is necessary to distinguish between the
behaviour of the physical system in time and the (dynamic) description of
this system using an algorithm that »determines« changes in such a system
based on (discreet) changes of a specific parameter (or parameters) that is
observable (measurable) at the time of occurrence. The latter is our de-
scription method that enables us to map the changes of the system’s states
onto the algorithmic steps. In order to be able to give such a description,
we must also have available certain interpretation that maps the system
states onto the sequence of abstract computational states, whereby every ak
state of the system is ‘obtained’ by using the initial k steps of the algorithm
at a specific input (Fields, 1996, p. 170). Fields points out that this kind of
mapping is possible only if all operations that are listed in the process of
mapping commutate algebraically (i.e. viewed from the perspective of
quantum mechanics, measurements or observations of the process are mu-
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tually independent). Fields refers to E. Ditriech, who in 1989 pointed out
that such an interpretation can only be constructed if the system is ante-
cendently, and informally, viewed as instantiating a function that can be
computed by the algorithm, and if the k steps of the algorithm are recog-
nized as computations of some antecedently understood subfunctions.
We need here a sufficient number of observed states of the system in order
to map these onto the computational states traversed by the algorithm
when it is applied to a given input. Fields speaks of such an interpretation
of the system as a ‘virtual machine’ for the algorithm. However, this inter-
pretation would be possible only if the behaviour of the system from an ini-
tial state (interpretable as an input to the algorithm) is always interpretable
as an execution of the algorithm for the given input.
This is certainly an idealized assumption or, better still, an assumed ideali-
zation rather than the realistic flow of events within the system. The sys-
tem, therefore, computes only inside the framework of our interpretation,
as a virtual machine and not per se. A dynamic description of the system
represents just a specific relation that gives a sufficiently accurate account
of the sequence of (measurable, observable) physical states of the system in
successive time intervals. In many cases it is possible to describe this se-
quence using a neat, continuous function, but the method is not essential –
what is essential for the computational working of the system is an inter-
pretation that presents the successive states of the system as a result of a
specific algorithm (i.e. the system of operations) applied to the correspon-
ding input states of the system that are the inputs for the virtual machine.
Fields’ reflections lead him to two important conclusions. The first is
»… that any system that can be interpreted as simulating a virtual machine for some function
f is a virtual machine for f. Similarly, any system that can be interpreted as simulating a uni-
versal computer is a universal computer. This feature of computation – that simulating com-
puting is computing – is what sets it apart from an uninterpreted dynamic process such as fluid
flow« (Fields, 1996, p. 171).
The second is
»… that a single physical system can often be interpreted as different virtual machines on the
basis of different sets of measurements, by interpreting the values of different sets of variables
as indicative of the state of the system« (ibid.).
Field’s first thesis that perfect simulation of computation is computation
should also be read vice versa, that is to say, every computation is its own
‘perfect simulation’, or such an interpretation of the working of the system
that presents it as perfect computation (i.e., it presents every state of the
system as a computing result of certain inputs and certain states of the sys-
tem). As a result, there is no ‘computation per se’, i.e. there is any flow of
events without a corresponding (computational) interpretation. This thought
can be linked with Wittgenstein’s interesting criticism (in Tractatus) of the
equation of operation and predication, or operation and facts (events)
(Wittgenstein, 1976). Wittgenstein actually argues that operations are an
integral part of our symbolism, i.e. the manner of presenting the relations
between the forms of the state of things rather than the states of things
themselves, facts or events in the world.
In principle, we have to distinguish between operations and (prepositional)
functions, which represent some relations in the world of facts. An opera-
tion represents formal relations, i.e. relations between forms rather than
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between the individual representatives of forms. Wittgenstein illustrates
this using the logical forms of sentences.
»A function cannot be its own argument, whereas operation can take one of its own results as
its base« (Tractatus, 5.251).
»It is only in this way that the step from one term of a series of forms to another is possible«
(5.252).
»One operation can counteract the effect of another. Operations can cancel one another«
(5.253).
»Further an operation can also vanish (e. g. negation in the case of double negation)« (5.254).
In principle, we cannot expect functions (i.e. the descriptions of objects’
properties or relations between them) to have the properties of operations.
According to Wittgenstein, the ‘internal’ or ‘formal’ relations between the
states of things, i.e. between the statements that describe these, cannot be
expressed with sensible sentences but can only be presented by means of
an operation that »represents a proposition as the result of an operation
that produces it out of other propositions (which are the basis of the opera-
tion)« (5.21). Wittgenstein’s assertion that operations are not functions
(predications) also means that operations are not any state of things or
facts, but they are our methods of representing the relations between the
forms of the representatives of the state of things. In this sense, computa-
tions, too, if they are true operations represented by the Turing machine’s
schemes, do not occur in ‘nature’ but within the symbolic systems of repre-
sentation.
Wittgenstein’s indication of the fundamental difference between predica-
tion and operation additionally supports Field’s distinction between com-
putation and the flow of events in some physical system. To describe the
flow of events, we use a sentence by which we relate the successive states of
the system and put them into a specific order, perhaps relying on some
mathematical function that expresses the natural law of occurrence. How-
ever, while such a description is not essential for the flow of events itself,
for computation a certain (symbolic) description of the flow of events is es-
sential. According to Wittgenstein, computation involves a successive (so-
metimes both successive and parallel) execution of operations that can be
represented only by using some symbolic system, i.e. by using appropriate
formal expressions, variables, operation tables or algorithmic procedures.
In his later works Wittgenstein drew attention to a similar distinction be-
tween the causal working of the machine and operational ‘working’ that
occurs within the representation of a machine as a symbol. These reflec-
tions are especially relevant for discussion of the ‘thinking machines,’ i.e.
any ‘strong’ program of artificial intelligence. Wittgenstein says that the
machine can be conceptualised idealistically, meaning by abstracting possi-
ble breakdowns, malfunctions etc. In such a case it seems »that a machine
has (possesses) such-and-such possibilities of movement« (P1, par. 193).3
Once we know the machine, we imagine that everything else is determined
in advance, say, a movement it will make. According to Wittgenstein, in
such a case we actually use the machine or the image of the machine (or
the diagram of the flow) as a symbol of a specific manner of functioning.
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This is completely different from a prediction about the actual behaviour
of a machine. Then we do not in general forget the possibility of a distorti-
on of the parts and so on. The actual machine can always make a move
completely different from the one ‘predicted’ by its symbolic counterpart,
because in the symbolic counterpart the possibility of breakdown is a priori,
i.e. grammatically, impossible. Wittgenstein hence concludes »that the mo-
vement of the machine-as-symbol is predetermined in a different sense
from that in which the movement of any given actual machine is predeter-
mined« (ibid.).
Yet even the talk about an ‘ideal’ or ‘idealized’ machine that is supposedly
embodied by the machine-as-symbol misleads one into assuming that the
machine has (possesses) its ‘possibilities of movement.’ Wittgenstein con-
cludes that
»… this possibility of movement is not the movement, but it does not seem to be the mere
physical conditions for moving either […] For while this is the empirical condition for move-
ment, one could also imagine it to be otherwise« (ibid.).
He further says that to us it seems that an ideal possibility of movement is
a kind of
»… shadow of the movement itself… We say: ‘experience will show whether this gives the pin
this possibility of movement’ but we do not say ‘experience will show whether this is the possi-
bility of this movement« (PI, par. 194).
In talking like this, we erroneously interpret our own manner of talk, by
taking the talk describing the operation of a machine-as-symbol to be a
description of the actual working of the machine. Wittgenstein says that
»we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civili-
zed men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest
conclusion from it« (ibid.). In short, a machine-as-symbol is a special ex-
pression of the rules of working, i.e. working according to the rule, rather
than actual working. In a similar way a machine for conjunction repre-
sented by means of a corresponding table of the transition of states, would
be a symbolic representation of a working by rule rather than the factual
working of some ‘logical machine’, for example, a simple processor that im-
plements conjunction.
Obviously, we have again arrived at the principled difference between ope-
rations within some symbolic system (model) and actual processes in the
world. Regardless of how perfectly a machine works (for example, a ma-
chine that implements some logical operation), that still does not mean
that that machine actually executes an operation, because even the most
perfect machine can break down; its working may be interrupted, or it may
be damaged, while in principle the execution of the operation excludes
such a ‘possibility’. For Wittgenstein, these possibilities are categorically,
grammatically excluded.
However, Wittgenstein denied the possibility that any expression of the
rule, i.e. rule following, represents the ultimate or original interpretation
or explanation of rule following. In this sense he would not unconditionally
agree with Field’s formulation that computational interpretation of the sys-
tem’s working by a computational rule already represents the actual follow-
ing of that computational rule, i.e. that the simulation of computation is
computation. Actually, in so far as ‘computational interpretation’ is only a
symbolic expression of the mapping of the system’s physical states onto the
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algorithmic states of the computation system, it is not possible to speak of
computation. Only the execution of this mapping, that is, actual following
of an algorithm is computation. In this sense, computation is just an actual
computational interpretation rather than, for example, an ‘imagined’ for-
mal interpretation that only describes the algorithm of computation. The
table of mappings or the table of transitions is not yet an operation but a
symbolic expression. If we combine the terminology used in Tractatus and
Philosophical Investigations, we could say that actual computation only shows
itself through the use of a specific algorithm in an environment such as is a
social, publicly accessible practice (PI, par. 202), technique (par. 199) or
custom (par. 199) in which we ourselves must participate logically, while to
describe it we have to use some formal symbolism.
However, a sensible participation in the practice of rule following is not
simply an ‘adequate’ response of the actor to certain inputs, but participa-
tion in the life form of beings for whom rule following is a sensible and ba-
sically unquestionable, understandable action. This non-questionability must
simply be accepted as a basic fact.
»What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life« (PI, II xi, p. 226).
The shared human form of life is not something that is fixed, but our com-
mon way of agency. It is a net of activities that determines our understand-
ing and agency. Wittgenstein speaks about this in Zettel (Z, par. 576).
»How can we describe the human way of action? Well, only by showing how the actions of
various people swarm in all directions. It is not what one thinks right now, an individual acti-
on, but the whole swarming of human actions that forms the background against which we ob-
serve every particular action and which determines our judgment, our notions and reactions.«
For Wittgenstein, the rules, i.e. rule following as well as operations and
execution of operations, are an inseparable component of the human form
of life, i.e. »the swarming of human actions«. For this reason, rule follow-
ing cannot be abstracted and observed separately from this background –
for example, in such a way as to ask whether some machine or organism in
itself follows the rule.
Since thinking implies the ability to follow rules, Wittgenstein argues that it
is not sensible to ask whether, for example, the machine thinks. Or, to be
more precise, such a question would imply a certain resemblance with the
human being.
»Could a machine think? Could it be in pain? – Well, is the human body to be called such a
machine? It surely comes as close as possible to being such a machine (PI, par. 359). But a
machine surely cannot think! Is that an empirical statement? No. We only say of a human be-
ing and what is like one that it thinks. We also say it of dolls and no doubt of spirits too. Look
at the word ‘to think’ as a tool.« (PI, par. 360).
Wittgenstein, therefore, does not reject completely the possibility that a
machine could think, but only under the assumption of a certain resem-
blance with humans, if only a virtual one. But whence could such a resem-
blance arise? Of course, from our representation that the working of a ma-
chine is part of the human form of life, that it is a logical part of the net of
human agency, for example, the net of human communication, cooperation
among people in common projects, games etc. All that we can say is that, if
we could imagine a robot that accurately imitates human actions in para-
digmatic life situations and participates on an equal footing in human com-
munication, then we could imagine such a robot as a ‘thinking one’. This is
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similar to how we imagine the behaviour of ‘live puppets’ (e.g. Pinocchio)
or spirits. Yet, the road from imagination to implementation is long, per-
haps even impossible.
In the last sentence in the quotation given above, Wittgenstein hints that
this is as if thinking were a tool. Can thinking be a tool? Perhaps in a man-
ner similar to that in which our hands are a ‘tool’ for work. Undoubtedly,
this is one possible perspective on thinking, but it involves just one aspect
and fails to take account of the whole. We can view thinking as if it were a
tool (created by evolution, nature, God etc.), but the very fact that we view
thinking as if it were a tool says that thinking in itself is not a tool. For ex-
ample, we cannot view humans ‘as alive’ or ‘as thinking’, but we simply
hold humans to be alive and thinking. We could view a human being »as if
it were a puppet«, but that is not its ‘nature’. Similarly, we could view a
puppet not »as if it were a simulation of a man« but as being a simulation of
a man (for us). And I could view the puppet as if it was alive, a thinking be-
ing, but that is not its ‘nature’.
Does Wittgenstein’s rejection of the mental phenomena seen as internal
states within the individual’s neural and physiological structure mean that
he abandoned scientific psychology? Does it mean that we should interpret
psychological phenomena only as social phenomena, or at least ‘interperso-
nal’ rather than ‘personal’? Indeed, Wittgenstein is quite frequently viewed
as an opponent of scientific psychology (see e.g. Williams, 1999, Rey,
2003), but his piercing remarks about philosophy would equally, or even
more strongly, ‘justify’ the assertion that he was an opponent of philosophy
as well. In my opinion such conclusions are premature. It is more probable
that Wittgenstein strived to ‘get rid’ of all psychological, philosophical and
other kinds of theories about human intellectuality, speech, communica-
tion and so on, because he attempted to expose that which in his opinion
was no theory but the manifestation of the ‘firm ground’, i.e. unambiguous
mastery of rules and language. Since some psychological and philosophical
theories attempted to encompass this ‘ground’ and explained it by using
natural scientific, psychological and philosophical assumptions and theo-
ries, they only further aggravated perspicuous presentation (PI, par. 109,
122), and Wittgenstein fervently resisted this. In his Remarks on the Phi-
losophy and Psychology, he even outlined a kind of plan for the analysis of
psychological concepts, but everyday concepts rather than those invented
by science for its own purpose (RPP, II, par. 63, 148). This means that
when creating psychological concepts we must not break the link with their
everyday understanding. This is a trait that distinguishes psychology from
some natural sciences that pursue the greatest possible independence from
the everyday understanding of their subject areas. The preservation of the
systemic link between the everyday understanding of psychological con-
cepts and phenomena does not imply elimination of scientific psychology
or its reduction to behaviourism. As Mary McGrinn says, Wittgenstein’s
criticism of psychological concepts does not mean that psychological con-
cepts require behavioural criteria of application but is »an attempt to show
that we cannot derive an idea of what a given psychological state is simply
through introspection« (McGinn, 1997, p. 130). According to McGinn, the
moral of the argument against private language
»… is not that our psychological concepts must possess public criteria, but that it is only by re-
minding ourselves of the grammar of our ordinary psychological concepts that we can grasp
the essence, or nature, of a given kind of psychological state« (ibid.).
384SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA A. Ule, How Can One Catch a40 (2/2005) pp. (373–388) Thought-Bird?
I agree with this interpretation.
Undoubtedly such an understanding of psychology and psychological con-
cepts quite opposes the intentions of a large part of cognitive science, and
particularly those of the radical representatives of computationalism. So, in
my opinion, Wittgenstein cannot be described as a forerunner of cognitive
science, or of the computer metaphor or the like (although he was a good
friend of Turing).
I will take a look at two such interpretations: G. Rey’s essay Why Wittgen-
stein Ought to Have Been a Computationalist (2003) and J. Leiber’s book
An Invitation to Cognitive Science (1991). In Rey’s view, what separates
Wittgenstein from cognitive science is mainly his excessive preoccupation
with the first/third person problem. According to Wittgenstein, psychologi-
cal concepts are based on divergences between the first and third person
(Rey, 2003, p. 240). Wittgenstein abandons a theory of meaning that pre-
sumes that words enjoy a uniform referential relation to objects. Rey has
pointed that Wittgenstein sketched instead a theory involving a term’s role
in a context, language game, or form of life (p. 241). According to that theory,
»mental predicates like ‘hopes’, ‘expects’, ‘ardently loves’ are much more
widely relational than the traditional conception of ‘inner processes’ allows«
(ibid.) Rey correctly pointed to the fact that even Wittgenstein’s use of ‘be-
haviour’ itself is evidently intended to be thus broad. Rey discussed three
sources of support for Wittgenstein’s suggestions on the relational nature
of mental predicates and human behaviour in the modern philosophy of
mind: externalist intuitions about content, verificationist and ‘criteriologi-
cal’ theories of meaning, and functionalist conceptions of mental states.
Rey, however, tries to support all of these theories, especially the functio-
nalist approaches to meaning and mental states with some ‘mentalist’ hy-
potheses. The first of these is Modest Mentalism (MM), which proposes at
least two basic kinds of mental states, informational ones that represent
the world, and directional ones that direct their agent towards or away
from some represented state (p. 245). The second is the Causal/Compu-
tational-Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT), which states
»… that we should regard the brain as a computer performing operations in real time on logi-
cally complex internal representations, the primitives of which stand in certain co-variational
relations with either stimulus pattern or with phenomena in the environment« (p. 249).
The third hypothesis is the completion of CRTT with some internal mecha-
nism which produces qualia experiences, e.g. experiences of colours, tastes
of food, feeling of pain, etc. Ray claims
»… that such experiences are states involving a particular computational relation to specially
restricted predicates in a creature’s system of internal representation« (p. 258).
Rey believes that mental states supervene on states of the agent’s brain
and that the appropriate computational mechanisms can give us some ad-
ditional ‘outward criteria’ of mental states4 which some purely behavioural
criteria cannot give us (p. 257, 259). He can save talk of literal inner pro-
cesses without the assumption of their principial privacy. This theory »needs
some story with the kind of psychologically plausible details it provides« (p.
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SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA A. Ule, How Can One Catch a
40 (2/2005) pp. (373–388) Thought-Bird?
262), which was absent in Wittgenstein. Rey further »believes that he doubts
it is only philosophers who are captivated by the naïve, introspective pic-
ture of the mind, or only language is its source« (ibid). He is probably cor-
rect here. The naïve picture of mind or language is a set of simple analo-
gies or models taken from nature, and projected onto man. It is true that
»ordinary language can sustain and dispense with any number of good and
bad analogies; people can get captivated by bad analogies if there isn’t a
more sensible one to replace it« (p. 262). However, we have to be aware of
the suggestive ‘power’ of these analogies in order to prevent their non-
reflective use in science or philosophy. Additionally, Rey claims that such
naïve pictures are mostly our largely involuntary reactions to things that
look and act like our conspecifices. We project these pictures into them
correlative to that reaction in ourselves and are, indeed, unwilling to project
them into things that do not induce that reaction (p. 264).
In contrast to Rey, I think that the very idea of ‘inner processes’ in our
brains which produce mental states is one such powerful analogy that pos-
tulates some provisory outward criteria for mental processes and their
causal explanation but it still misleads us. I have tried to show that Witt-
genstein opposes the very concept of the inner process, either non-material
or material. We can extend Wittgenstein’s remark that it is
»… meaning not a process which accompanies a word. For no process could have the conse-
quences of meaning« (PI, II xi., p. 218)
to intending, seeing aspects, calculation, etc., and therefore, to many kinds
of thinking. These are Wittgenstein’s principal statements which cannot be
overridden or ‘improved’ by some more ‘scientific’ picture of inner pro-
cesses. Wittgenstein’s criticism of the machine metaphor clearly puts the
principal difference between operations in the symbolic model of the ma-
chine working, and possible real (mis)working of the machine. It isn’t only
the difference between the machine, taken in idealisation, in abstraction
from possible malfunctioning, and real working of the machine, but the
categorical difference between rule following in the symbolic model, and
sequences of events (states). Rey does briefly refer to the rule following
problem, and agrees with the »normativistic« concept of rule following ac-
cording to which »rule can be ‘normative’ insofar as a particular mechani-
cally realized algorithm might be the best idealized explanation of the ac-
tual operation in the brain« (Rey, 2003, p. 253 (rem. 48)). Rey agrees with
the opinion of Howich, Pietroski, et al. that the Kripke’s famous paradox
on rule following
»… has to do with the resources of idealization […], and not about normativity of rules-or the
presence of ‘surroundings that make standards into standards’ -but about whether it is reason-
able to construe the nervous system as realizing a particular mental competence« (ibid.).
However, if an algorithm may be the best idealized explanation of the actual
operation in the brain, then it is not the real (actual) brain process that is
performing an operation, or follows a rule but we who explain this process by
a ‘normative’ algorithm. It is quite unclear to speak on »mechanical realized
algorithm in the brain« because this ‘realization’ isn’t an algorithm. The
brain ‘works’ algorithmically only through our (active) interpretation as a
computing process (see the discussion of Field’s theses), not ‘per se’.5
In An Invitation to Cognitive Science (1991) J. Leiber argues that Wittgen-
stein is connected to cognitive science primarily through his rejection of
the ‘old paradigm’ of psychology, i.e. the dualistic theory of an embodied
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soul and the principle that we just know, by introspection, and know in
their entirety our mental states (p. 46, 70). The demolition of the old para-
digm leaves the way open for the ‘new paradigm’, that is the computational
theory of the mind (p. 65). Leiber believes that Wittgenstein is a ‘cognitive
naturalist’ (p. 61, 159). Leiber cites language-learning, face recognition,
aspect-perception and rule-following as some important common research
projects that connect Wittgenstein to cognitive science. Leiber strongly
criticized the view of Wittgenstein as an opponent of scientific psychology.
I will consider only one point in Leiber book, the claim that Wittgenstein’s
account of meaning and understanding leads naturally to a computational
view of mind (p. 67–68), and that he anticipated the computational model
of mind (p. 109). Leiber refers to Wittgenstein’s thesis that the meaning of
an expression is its role in a language-game. He interprets this thesis as the
thesis that the meaning of an expression is its place in a formalised proce-
dure (p. 77–78). Leiber refers here to Wittgenstein’s example of the lan-
guage-game of a shopkeeper in Philosophical Investigation.
Someone requested from the grocer five red apples. The grocer first opens
the drawer marked ‘apples’, then he looks up the word ‘red’ in a table and
finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal num-
bers – up to the word ‘five’ and for each number he takes an apple of the
same colour as the sample out of the drawer. It is in this and similar ways
that one operates with words (PI, par. 1). Leiber interprets this language-
game so that the meanings of the words ‘five’, ‘red’ and ‘apple’ are just
their roles in ‘step by step physical procedures’ (p. 66). For Leiber, the gro-
cer’s understanding of the utterance ‘five red apples’ consists in his mastery
of a technique, namely the simple competences of fetching and matching.
Leiber believes that a computer can do the same procedure as the grocer
performed. Thus he concludes with the thesis that Wittgenstein’s account
of meaning and understanding anticipated the computational model of the
mind.
We have seen that Wittgenstein strongly opposed the computational model
of the mind (and the representational hypothesis of thinking and speaking
too). Leiber has first to show that the step by step procedures involved in
the grocer’s language-game are in fact algorithmic and can be carried out
by computer, and second, that other language-games occur in the same
way, that is, as performing some algorithmic procedures which can also be
performed by computers.
First, it is hard to see that the grocer’s procedure in the language game is
in fact algorithmic because the grocer’s actions can be much more compli-
cated than they seem at first glance. It could be that the complete descrip-
tion of the physical procedure transcends the possibility of any algorithm,
and thus they cannot be simulated on a computer. Sure, we can interpret
the given language-game in an idealized model but it would be only a for-
mal symbol of the language-game where some algorithmically defined op-
erations can be »done«, and not the real process of the language-game.
Sure, our every-day understanding of this language-game as a step by step
process can be very close to the algorithmic model of the game, but this un-
derstanding needn’t be very close to the pure physical process. For exam-
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ple, our intuitive »parsing« of the grocer’s behaviour in the language-game
could be very different from the real »elements« of his behaviour which are
modelled by a computer, because we usually follow the language descrip-
tion of the game, and not the adequate physical description of the events.
Leiber also didn’t present any proof of the thesis that all other language-
games could be present algorithmically, as in the grocer’s case. He refers to
Wittgenstein’s claim that language-games are part of our natural history,
and claims that we have a natural history of formalizing (p. 68). In the
Leiber’s account, all language-games involve formalised procedures but
some independent evidence does not support this thesis. The same objec-
tion that was raised to the grocer’s language-game can apply to all of them.
The human ability to perform step-by step procedures can be, in fact, the
result of our natural history, but these procedures and our competence for
executing such procedures could still be much too complicated for any ex-
act formal description by algorithms which could be performed by a com-
puter.
There is another important question that is similar to that I raised in the
section discussing Rey’s thesis. This question is whether Leiber truly suc-
ceeded in showing that algorithm-based processes in the brain can explain
our ability to follow rules and whether the computer simulation of these
processes corresponds to human rule following. A computer can indeed
»behave in accordance with the rule« yet not actually follow the rule, be-
cause it lacks the required competence. For Wittgenstein, this competence
develops within the community which pursues the practice of rule following,
adheres to certain customs, trains rule following and various techniques of
rule following, etc. Lieber would have to show how this activity could be
translated into algorithmic processes that could be potentially simulated by
the computer, if he wanted to show that all language games contain for-
mally describable algorithmic processes. Alternately, he should refute the
distinction Wittgenstein made between behaviour »in accordance with the
rule« and competitive knowledge of the rule.
D. Proudfoot and B. J. Copeland have recently presented a comprehensive
criticism of Leiber’s book, which I myself have followed, although their
criticism is more extensive and includes, for example, the criticism of re-
presentational understanding of meaning, speech and perception in the
computational models of cognitive science. Proudfoot and B. J. Copeland
reject Leiber’s conviction that Wittgenstein aimed at a scientific under-
standing of the mind that transcends everyday understanding, and that
Wittgenstein’s explanation of cognition was causal in its intention, i.e. pro-
to-scientific (Proudfoot, Copeland, 1994). The authors point out the differ-
ence between the conceptual and causal explanations that is similar to the
difference between the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions used by many cognitive
scientists (for example by N. Block). In his criticism of functionalism, Block
argues that the question ‘How does the processor work?’ is not a question
for cognitive science to answer. This question may belong in another disci-
pline, electronic circuit theory. However, we must distinguish the question
of how something works from the question of what it does. For Block, the
question of what a primitive processor does is a part of cognitive science,
but the question of how it does is not (Block, 1990, p. 257). Proudfoot and
Copeland claim that the »primitive component – the ‘endpoint – in the ex-
planation of, e.g., meaning and understanding, is the natural behaviour of
the human being at the level of ordinary lived experience«. However, clari-
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fying the role of natural human behaviour in creating the forms of life and
language-games generating our ordinary concept of mind is a matter for
philosophy. The investigation of the causal mechanism underlying such be-
haviour is not (Proudfoot, Copeland, 1994, p. 514–515). They claim that
»cognitive science, in so far as it is the further investigation of what for
Wittgenstein is a primitive component, is nothing more than a ‘realization
science’«. Assuredly, this role doesn’t suit the current conceptions of many
philosophers of the mind. Thus, they conclude that, »contrary to Leiber’s
view, Wittgenstein is no cognitive scientist, even one in heavy disguise«,
and he was neither a mentalist nor a behaviourist, neither a proponent of
Leiber’s ‘old paradigm’ nor a cognitive scientist. The old and the new para-
digms do not present a genuine dichotomy, as many people assume (ibid.).
These thoughts appropriately conclude my reflections on how to capture
thought in the web of cognitive science. In my opinion, the theorists of cog-
nitive science have not yet seriously considered Wittgenstein’s criticism of
»internal processes« (and states), and surprisingly they frequently confuse
the question »how does it work?« with the question »what does it do?«.
Similarly, they confuse causal explanation with operations in a symbolic
model (or, more generally, with rule following), as well as behaviour in ac-
cordance with the rule with rule following. But the most »serious error« is
the confusion of internal computational (or parallel) processes in the brain
that may cause mental states with external, socially, based everyday criteria
of recognition, classification and knowledge of the content of mental states.
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Andrej Ule
Wie kann man einen
Gedankenvogel fangen?
Einige Kommentare von Wittgenstein zur
komputationalen Formung des Geistes
In diesem Essay analysiert der Autor Wittgensteins Kritik an einigen Annahmen, die für einen
Grossteil der Kognitionswissenschaft von zentraler Bedeutung sind. Diese umfassen die Konzepte
von komputationalen Prozessen im Gehirn, die mentale Zustände und Prozesse hervorbringen, die
algorythmische Informationsprozessierung im Gehirn (neurales System), das Gehirn als Maschine,
den psychophysischen Parallelismus, die Denkmaschine sowie die Konfusion der Regel, die dem
Benehmen folgt im Einklang mit dieser Regel. Nach Meinung des Autors haben die Theoretiker
der Kognitionswissenschaft Wittgensteins Kritik noch immer nicht ernsthaft erörtert, so dass sie,
was verwundern mag, häufig die Frage »Wie funktioniert das?« mit der Frage »Was macht das?«
verwechseln. Doch ihr »verhängnisvollster« Fehler besteht in der Verwechslung interner komputa-
tionaler (oder paralleler) Prozesse, die im Gehirn stattfinden (und die möglicherweise mentale
Zustände erzeugen) mit sozialbegründeten, alltäglichen Kriterien des Erkennens und der Klassi-
fizierung des Inhalts und des Wissens vom Inhalt mentaler Zustände.
Andrej Ule
Comment peut-on attraper
l’oiseau de la pensée?
Les commentaires certains du models
computationnels de Wittgenstein
Dans cet essai, j’analyse la critique que Wittgestein fait d’un certain nombre de thèses qui sont cru-
ciales pour une grande partie de la science cognitive. Il s’agit notamment des concepts de proces-
sus computationnels dans le cerveau qui causent des états mentaux, du traitement algorithmique
des informations dans le cerveau (le système neuronal), du cerveau comme machine, du para-
llélisme psychophysique, de la machine pensante, ainsi que de la confusion du fait de suivre des
règles avec le comportement qui est en conformité avec ces règles. À mon avis, les théoriciens de la
science cognitive n’ont pas encore examiné sérieusement la critique de Wittgenstein, de sorte que,
chose étonnante, ils confondent souvent la question »comment cela fonctionne?« avec la question
»qu’est-ce que cela fait-il?«. Mais leur erreur »capitale«, c’est de confondre les processus computa-
tionnels internes (ou parallèles) se déroulant dans le cerveau (qui peut-être causent différents états
mentaux) avec les critères quotidiens, socialement basés, de reconnaissance, de classifications et
de connaissance des contenus des états mentaux.
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